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– the Union for the Mediterranean – was launched
in 2008, but suffered from the same defects as
the ENP.
This Policy Contribution begins by comparing the
development levels and the socio-economic
framework conditions in the FCCs at the start of
their transition, with the situation in the SMCs
today. We include in the FCC group the eight coun-
tries of central and eastern Europe that joined the
EU in 2004 (NMS-8), plus the south-eastern Euro-
pean countries (SEECs) and the former Soviet
republics (FSRs). We examine the different devel-
opment patterns of the NMS-8, FSRs and SEECs
during the 20 years since the beginning of their
transition, and identify success factors. We con-
clude that the Union for the Mediterranean frame-
work is too weak to provide the necessary EU
assistance to domestic reforms in the SMCs, and
propose the creation, by 2030, of a Euro-Mediter-
ranean Economic Area similar to the existing Euro-
pean Economic Area. We also outline the
conditional steps that the EU and the SMCs will
need to take gradually to achieve this goal.
WHERE DO THE SMCs STAND?
Despite significant differences, the five SMCs have
much in common with each other (Table 1). All five
have young populations and are growing, but lack
employment opportunities. Only Libya stands out
from the group as the least populated and the rich-
est, with a vast natural resource endowment. The
other four are relatively poor, with significant agri-
cultural populations and out-migration.
Libya apart, the SMCs' level of per capita output
measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) is well
below that of the average of the FCCs at the begin-
ning of their transition in 1990. In 2009, per capita
GDP in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia was
between 15-28 percent of the corresponding
EU27 figure. By contrast, the per capita GDP of the
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AT THE BEGINNING OF 2011 the political estab-
lishment in the Arab world was shaken by a previ-
ously inconceivable wave of protests. The
Egyptian and Tunisian regimes were ousted. Only
military intervention and concessions have kept
the administrations in place for now in many other
Arab countries. Economic dissatisfaction, espe-
cially among the growing but under-employed
young population has underpinned the uprisings.
From a European perspective, these events have
some echoes of the change in the communist bloc
two decades ago. The European Union responded
to the communist collapse with a firm commit-
ment to support the transition of the region's
economies and the integration of ten former com-
munist countries into the EU. The transformation
of central and eastern Europe was a success for
the countries involved and for Europe as a whole.
Are there lessons in this for the EU's relationship
with the southern Mediterranean countries
(SMCs) of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and
Tunisia?
In particular, can the EU really base initiatives for
the Mediterranean countries on the central and
eastern European precedent? To answer this
question, this Policy Contribution explores what
lessons can be drawn from the economic transi-
tion of the former communist countries (FCCs) for
the future development of the SMCs. The EU's past
efforts to offer to its southern neighbours a frame-
work for partnership had mixed results. The Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed
to provide an economic and political framework for
cooperation between the EU and its eastern and
Mediterranean neighbours, in order to increase
stability and prosperity. However, the ENP
achieved little, partly because of domestic condi-
tions in the neighbouring countries and partly
because the EU failed to define clearly its future
relationship with its neighbours. A specific policy
framework aimed at the Mediterranean countries
FCCs (simple average) in 19931 was about 40 per-
cent of the per capita GDP of the countries that
now form the EU27. Per capita GDP was even
higher in the NMS-8 countries.
THE INITIAL ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS
There is a rich literature on the key elements of
economic transition in the SMCs2. In the following,
we compare the initial economic framework con-
ditions of the SMCs with those of the FCCs. For this
1.  Caution should be
applied when interpreting
the pre-transition GDP of
FCCs. The transition crisis,
which lasted until the mid-
1990s and implied a
massive decrease in GDP in
all the countries, revealed
that much of the 1990 GDP
was due to the biased price
system in the command-
and-control economies.
Consequently we use 1993
as our base year.
2. Development of
infrastructure
(Bhattacharya and Wolde,
2010), better education,
improvement in the labour
markets (Pissarides and
Véganzonès-Varoudakis,
2007), development in the
allocation of financial
resources especially to
SMEs (Ersel and Kandil,
2007) and progress in the
system of governance and
institutions (Page and Van
Gelder, 2001) are some of
the factors for promoting
growth in the region.
3. The restriction in the
number of countries taken
into account for the
comparison groups, even if
discretionary, allows
individual indicators for
each country to be taken
into account, and better
evaluation of similarities
and differences.
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund, Historical Public Debt database and World
Economic Outlook (October 2010); UNDP, Human Development Report (2010); Population Division of the Department of
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects (2008 Revision).
Table 1: Selected indicators for the latest available year
Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia SMCs
Population in millions 34.9 83 6.4 32 10.4 166.7
GDP (current US$ billions) 141 188 62 91 40 522
GDP per capita (current US$) 4029 2270 9714 2811 3792 3131
GDP growth (average % 2005-2009) 2.9 6 5.5 4.8 4.8 5.1
Public debt (in percent of GDP) 14 76 - 48 43 43
Agricultural employment (% total employment) 20.7 31.2 - 40.9 - 31
Agricultural added value (in % of total added value) 8.3 15.3 2.3 14 11 11.3
Manufacturing added value (in % of total added value) 4.7 15.5 4.7 15.1 16.6 11.1
Mining, utilities added value (in % of total added value) 47 14.2 58.8 4.7 6.9 26.1
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.3 -1.8 15 -5.4 -3.1 0.1
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 60 36 73 51 85 53
Share of population aged 15-24 in % 20.5 20.2 17.3 19.7 19.3 20
Unemployment in % 13.8 8.7 - 9.6 14.2 10.3
Net migration per 1000 inhabitants -0.82 -0.84 0.64 -2.7 -0.4 -1.11
Human Development Index (2010 value) 0.67 0.62 0.76 0.57 0.68 0.63
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Figure 1: GDP per capita relative to EU27 before transition
Source: Bruegel, World Bank. In PPP (constant 2005 US dollars).
purpose we compare Algeria, Egypt, Libya,
Morocco and Tunisia with four FSRs (Armenia,
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine) three of the
NMS-8 (Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) and four
SEECs (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania)3.
MARKET
The move from a command-and-control economy
towards a market economy was at the heart of the
transition, resulting in a huge jump in GDP per
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capita in most FCCs. In terms of the role of mar-
kets, the SMCs are already more advanced than
the FCCs were at the beginning of their transition.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment's (EBRD) transition indicators clearly
show that the degree of privatisation and liberali-
sation in the SMCs in 2004 (the last year for which
comparable data is available) surpassed the com-
parable values for the FCCs at the beginning of
their transition.
In addition, by 2009, the SMCs were able to attract
a significant stock of foreign direct investment,
while in 1990, the FCCs were not (Figure 2). This
illustrates how far the FCCs were from being
market economies at that time.
Although economic development in SMCs is con-
strained by a high degree of public intervention4
and insufficient market reforms5, these countries
are much closer to being market economies than
the FCCs were at the beginning of their transition.
REGULATION
The quality of political/administrative institutions
is a key determinant of economic performance6.
The systems in the SMCs today and the FCCs at
the beginning of their transition, are structurally
different. The FCCs typically featured a large, cen-
tralised, well educated, almost omnipotent, but
still inefficient bureaucracy. The SMCs by contrast
have much more decentralised, less well-educated
4. See Sala-i-Martin and v.
Artadi (2002).
5. See Nabli and Végan-
zonès-Varoudakis (2007).
6. Méon and Sekkat
(2004).
7. Darden and Grzymala-
Busse (2006) show how
pre-communist levels of
education translate into
voting behaviour after the
end of communism. Iliev
and Putterman (2007) find
pre-communist statehood
to be a predictor for post-
communist growth.
but also inefficient bureaucracies.
In 1996 – the earliest date for which correspon-
ding data from the World Bank is available – the
quality of institutions in the NMS-8 was signifi-
cantly higher than in the SMCs today (Figure 3).
This most likely reflects both a better starting
point and a quicker transition in these countries
compared to the FSRs and the SEECs. The situa-
tion in the SMCs today is more comparable to that
in the FSRs and the SEECs in the 1990s.
Furthermore, social institutions and cultural fac-
tors have been shown to affect development pat-
terns. Various studies show that the
pre-communist institutions mattered for both the
economic and political transition in the FCCs. The
NMS-8 in particular benefited from their pre-com-
munist episode of relative economic and personal
freedom, as well as the presence of functional
institutions7.
HUMAN CAPITAL
The availability of a well-educated workforce was
seen as one of the big assets of the FCCs twenty
years ago. Illiteracy rates were negligible and the
level of schooling was comparable to that in west-
ern Europe. Shrinking populations and brain-
drains were the main human capital concerns for
the FCCs during the transition.
Currently, SMCs face an almost inverse challenge.
Average NMS-8, 1990s Average FSRs, 1990s Average SEECs, 1990s
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Figure 2: Foreign direct investment stock (% of GDP)
Source: UNCTAD.
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8.Calderón and Servén
(2004).
In terms of quantity and quality of education, they
significantly lag behind the FCCs (Figure 4). The
current average years of total schooling in the best
SMCs (Libya 7.2 years) is below the correspon-
ding values for the worst-performing FCCs in 1990
(Kazakhstan 7.7 years). Moreover, education in
the SMCs does not seem to be well targeted at the
local labour market. University graduates in Alge-
ria and Morocco constitute a small proportion of
the total unemployed, but have the highest unem-
ployment rate, indicating that these countries
suffer from a low return on education, which even-
tually translates to a low propensity to stay in
school/university.
In the five countries unemployment is between 9
percent (Egypt) and 30 percent (Libya). Youth
unemployment in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia is
above 30 percent. This inability of the economies
to employ their present human capital leads to
high migration pressure and keeps the countries
at the brink of social unrest.
INFRASTRUCTURE
Growth is positively affected by the stock of
infrastructure assets8. But physical infrastructure
in the SMCs today is on average inferior to that in
the FCCs at the beginning of their transition.
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Figure 4: Average years of schooling
Source: Barro-Lee (2010).
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Figure 3: Governance indicator
Source: World Bank world governance indicators.
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According to a composite index on physical
infrastructure based on the methodology of
Kumar and De (2008), only Albania in 1990
performed worse than Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and
Tunisia today (Figure 5).
In terms of infrastructure management, the SMCs
perform worse than the FCCs at the beginning of
their transition. As indicated by the EBRD infra-
structure reform indicator, the management of
infrastructure in Algeria and Tunisia is at the level
the NMS-8 achieved in 1995. Only Morocco is
more advanced, with the infrastructure manage-
ment level reached by the NMS-8 in 19999.
9. See World Bank (2006).
GROWTH PERFORMANCE
The previous sections examined how the current
socio-economic conditions in the SMCs compare
with those in the FCCs at the start of their transi-
tion period. In this section we examine what has
the growth performance of the FCCs has been
during the last 20 years, and reflect on the lessons
for the SMCs.
In the past decade, the FCCs grew at an annual
rate of 5.3 percent (Figure 6). This shows that
after an initial slump, the transition unlocked sig-
nificant economic growth potential. This potential
was founded on a favourable factor endowment
(eg skilled labour and infrastructure) and on the
Al
ge
ria
Eg
yp
t
Li
by
a
M
or
oc
co
Tu
ni
si
a
Cz
ec
h 
Re
p.
Es
to
ni
a
Hu
ng
ar
y
Li
th
ua
ni
a
La
tv
ia
Po
la
nd
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sl
ov
en
ia
Ar
m
en
ia
Az
er
ba
ija
n
Be
la
ru
s
Ge
or
gi
a
Ka
za
kh
st
an
Ky
rg
yz
st
an
M
ol
do
va
Ru
ss
ia
Ta
jik
is
ta
n
Tu
rk
m
en
is
ta
n
Uk
ra
in
e
Uz
be
ki
st
an
Al
ba
ni
a 
Bo
sn
ia
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Cr
oa
tia
M
ac
ed
on
ia
M
on
te
ne
gr
o
Ro
m
an
ia
Se
rb
ia
SMCs NMS-8 FSRs SEECs
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1993 2009
Figure 6: Development of GDP per capita relative to EU27 average between 1993 and 2009
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank data. In PPP (constant 2005 US dollars).
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10. TACIS: Technical
Assistance to the
Commonwealth of
Independent States.
According to the EU, “the
Community's TACIS
programme encourages
democratisation, the
strengthening of the rule of
law and the transition to a
market economy”.
presence of advantageous informal institutions.
These favourable conditions were under-exploited
in the pre-transition economic system and their
subsequent awakening underpinned a rapid
catching-up. Furthermore, the political transition
allowed the FCCs to reduce expenditure on inter-
nal and external security.
Apart of these characteristics, shared to some
degree by all FCCs, significant regional differences
in terms of the initial level of economic develop-
ment, the presence of institutions and the Euro-
pean response to the transition, translated into
different regional development patterns.
From the beginning of their transition, the NMS-8
achieved a higher level of economic development.
Some of the NMS-8 inherited valuable social cap-
ital from their pre-communist past, and European
action towards these countries was very bold. The
success of the NMS-8 indicates that the combina-
tion of their favorable initial conditions, the policy
decisions taken and the European response cre-
ated a virtuous cycle. Based on their relatively
good initial conditions, the EU established strong
trade relations, granted (initially limited) labour
mobility, offered substantial transition funds and,
even in 1993, held out the prospect of EU mem-
bership. These measures were conditional on the
implementation of economic and political reforms
by the NMS-8. The offer of EU accession, the visi-
ble effects of European funds and the transition-
induced improvements in quality of life, meant
that much of the NMS-8 population was willing to
abandon legacy privileges, such as food and fuel
subsidies. Furthermore, the flat distribution of
assets at the beginning of the transition limited
the power of vested interests. Consequently, bold
economic reforms were politically sustainable. In
the mid-term, economic reforms led to substantial
and inclusive growth. Consequently, further
reforms were politically feasible, and equipped the
countries for ultimate EU membership.
The FSRs started with a lower level of economic
development as well as the absence of a pre-
‘The economic growth potential that could be unleashed by transition in the southern
Mediterranean countries is probably less than that in former communist countries at the
beginning of their transition.’
communist episode of economic and personal
freedom. For this and other reasons, their
institutions started from a significantly weaker
position, and many of the FSRs still endure fights
for property rights that prevent investment and
distract from economic development. Meanwhile,
levels of corruption are higher and there is less
trust in markets. The EU's response to transition
in the FSRs was cautious and was unable to break
the vicious cycle of: (i) reluctance to reform
because of fear of instability and (ii) limited
growth. The EU did not offer the possibility of EU
membership, free trade or labour mobility. The
technical and financial assistance (TACIS10: about
€2 per capita per year) certainly helped to improve
institutional capacity in these countries, but a lack
of clear conditionality aligned to a long-term
strategy meant the transition was hampered.
Interestingly, the EU strategy towards the (com-
paratively small) SEECs has switched from the
second (FSR-type) to the first (NMS-8 type) of
these models in the last decade. The willingness
of the EU to provide an anchor for reforms in these
countries has contributed to substantial progress
in some of them, highlighting the value of a long-
term EU perspective.
From 2005-09, GDP growth in the SMCs was sig-
nificant (5.1 percent per year), but was clearly
socially unsustainable, as indicated by the high
youth unemployment, and as demonstrated by
recent events. The economic growth potential that
could be unleashed by transition in the SMCs is
probably lower than that in the FCCs at the begin-
ning of their transition. First, in terms of factor
endowment the SMCs have a less well educated
labour force and an inferior infrastructure. Second,
some of the potential gains from transition pres-
ent in the NMS-8 in 1990 have already been
reaped in the economic systems of the SMCs: the
allocation of goods and production factors is
already markets-based to a great extent, and the
countries are part of international value chains.
However, there is significant room for
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improvement. The quality of regulation in SMCs is
poor. Liberalisation remains incomplete in many
sectors and the state interferes pervasively with
the pricing mechanism. International trade is
constrained by trade barriers. And certain sectors
are cut off from foreign investment. These factors
constrain market–based development.
Overcoming this through economic reform could
give a significant boost to growth. However,
serious reforms would produce highly visible
losers, such as employees in protected sectors,
recipients of subsidised food and owners of
economic rents. The scale of the necessary
structural adjustment (eg high agricultural
employment) would make such political reforms
unsustainable if the economic gains do not accrue
rapidly and cannot be quickly redistributed to the
losers. The alternative would be conditional
outside assistance and a credible political project
that encourages the population and politicians to
tolerate a limited period of social hardship.
A EUROPEAN RESPONSE
The EU has – at least since the start of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership in 199511 – accepted
that it plays an important role in the southern
Mediterranean region. For the last fifteen years,
EU policy towards the SMCs has been structured
around trade, migration and assistance.
In terms of trade, EU liberalisation so far has
mainly covered industrial goods, while agricultural
products, which are vital for the SMCs, are largely
excluded. Negotiations to open up agricultural
trade and to liberalise trade in services and invest-
ment started in 2008 but are not yet concluded.
Migration is considered to be one of the priority
areas of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, but
little progress has been achieved because of con-
flicting interests.
Assistance to the SMCs, meanwhile, has been sub-
stantial. EU support to the Mediterranean coun-
tries12 has been the second largest European
programme for external assistance, allocating
almost €9 billion between 1995-2006. Yet,
because of lack of conviction and ownership on
both sides, this support is not seen as having been
very effective13. In 2007-2010 the new European
11. The Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (aka Barcelona
Process) was launched by
15 EU members and 14
Mediterranean partners, as
the framework to manage
both bilateral and regional
relations. It seeks to create
a Mediterranean region of
peace, security and shared
prosperity. Its main pillars
are a political and security
dialogue, the gradual estab-
lishment of a free-trade
area and promoting inter-
cultural dialogue.
12.  Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon,
Libya, Jordan, Syria,
Tunisia, Occupied Palestin-
ian authority, Morocco,
Israel.
13.  The Nair Report (2001)
on the Barcelona Process to
the European Parliament
highlighted the lack of
strategic vision as one of
the reasons for the failure of
the policy. According to
Natorski (2008) the low
level of intra-European
coherence, the limited and
slowly disbursed funds as
well as the lack of a sense
of co-ownership and cooper-
ation between the partners
made MEDA ineffective.
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
(ENPI) spent respectively €7.20 and €5.20 per
capita per year for Tunisia and Morocco (by com-
parison Ukraine receives €2.70 per capita per year
from the ENPI). Bilateral aid from individual EU
governments, and EIB financing for the region, are
also substantial.
But the main problem with the EU approach so far
is that it has been piecemeal, with no real effort to
bundle together its trade, migration and assis-
tance policies into an overall strategy to support
development in the SMCs. The responsibility lies,
however, not only with the EU but also with the
Mediterranean partners, which have not shown
determination to implement the necessary social,
political and economic reforms.
The events in Egypt and Tunisia open up the tan-
talising prospect of a transition towards a new
social, political and economic era in the SMCs and
in the Mediterranean region as whole. Whether or
not these countries will be able to transform their
societies and follow a path towards sustainable
development will be determined first and foremost
by their own efforts. But there is much that Europe
can and must do to ensure a favourable outcome
which is in its own interest. Europe must provide
short- and medium-term financial assistance to
help the SMCs, and should mobilise its develop-
ment banks to help foster transformation. But
above all, the EU should define a new strategy
towards these countries that spells out the credi-
ble and comprehensive approach to the Euro-
Mediterranean relationship that has so far been
lacking. The approach must include short- and
medium-term concrete and measurable steps
designed to foster the transition process.
The EU should offer the SMCs full accession to the
EU single market by 2030, provided the countries
meet the necessary conditions in terms of meet-
ing the relevant acquis communautaire. This
would entail the progressive elimination of all bar-
riers to the free circulation of goods, services, cap-
ital and labour as well as the adoption by the SMCs
of all the rules and policies linked to the single
market. It would also include access to specific
transfer mechanisms designed to foster eco-
nomic, social and environmental convergence and
to offset the costs. For example, the SMCs would
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‘By 2030, Europe and the Mediterranean countries would constitute a vast Euro-Med Economic
Area (EMEA) similar to the present European Economic Area (EEA) that links the EU to Iceland,
Norway and Liechtenstein, sharing “everything but institutions” with the EU.’
14. Speech by Romani Prodi
in Louvain-la-Neuve in
December 2002.
15. This order of magnitude
is certainly not unrealistic.
At the G8 Deauville Summit
in May 2011, President
Sarkozy said that “multilat-
eral development banks
could provide over €14bn,
including €3.5bn from the
EIB, for Egypt and Tunisia
for 2011-2013 in support of
suitable reform efforts”. He
has also announced that G8
members could increase
this effort up to €28bn.
get access to specific structural funds and be
allowed to issue emission permits usable in the
EU’s emission trading system (ETS).
If successful, the process would imply that, by
2030, Europe and the Mediterranean countries
would constitute a vast Euro-Med Economic Area
(EMEA) similar to the present European Economic
Area (EEA) that links the EU to Iceland, Norway
and Liechtenstein. At that stage the Mediter-
ranean countries would effectively share ‘every-
thing but institutions’ with the EU, a concept
already put forward by the European Commission
back in 200214 in the spirit of extending to
Europe’s neighbours the set of economic, social
and political principles and standards that define
the EU itself.
Achieving this long term vision requires bold but
gradual steps on both shores of the Mediter-
ranean. While the SMCs would have to gradually
implement the European legislation and transform
their economies, the EU will have to support the
countries' efforts financially but also demonstrate
its commitment to the long-term vision by gradu-
ally fulfilling its promises of opening its markets
to goods, services, capital and labour. The hope is
to generate the kind of virtuous circle of economic
reforms and sustainable growth that helped the
countries of central and eastern Europe at the
beginning and throughout their transition period. 
Membership of the EMEA should therefore be
viewed as the ultimate goal of a process involving
a quid pro quo approach in which the benefits
offered by the EU are conditional on the achieve-
ment of clearly defined transition milestones on
the part of the Mediterranean countries.
On the EU side, the key offers would include: a
revised trade agreement providing for the gradual
elimination of all remaining barriers to the free
circulation of goods, services and capital. This
would include agricultural products, which should
have front-loaded access to the European market.
The permanent access to the European labour
market for certain categories of Mediterranean
workers, especially professionals, should be
organised through a ‘Blue Card’ system, a
temporary European work permit for high skilled
foreigners, as proposed by von Weizsäcker
(2006). More generally, the EU should do its part
to put in place circular migration schemes.
Although its main contribution should be in terms
of regulatory changes (mainly in the area of trade
and migration), Europe should also provide
substantial assistance for human capital
(including institutional capacity building) and
physical infrastructure development through both
the EU budget and European financial institutions
such as the EBRD and the EIB. An amount of €10
billion per year for a period of 10 years (equivalent
of 2.5 per cent of the present GDP of the SMCs)
would be sufficient in our view and would
represent a good investment in the stability of
Europe’s southern neighbourhood15.
On the Mediterranean side, the milestones would
include the gradual implementation of EU legisla-
tion in the economic field (such as competition
policy, investment protection and consumer pro-
tection) and in the areas of social and environ-
mental policies. In order to ensure the success of
circular migration schemes, Mediterranean coun-
tries also need to put in place effective legal and
institutional mechanisms to promote the reinte-
gration of returning migrants, including temporary
tax exemptions for entrepreneurs, portability of
social rights, and retraining programmes. In gen-
eral, it would be crucial for the EU to put in place a
system of effective conditionality aimed at the
creation of the rule of law in all areas conducive to
sustainable development.
There is a significant risk that the high hopes of
the local population and of the international
community towards the future economic and
political situation in the Mediterranean countries
could turn sour in the coming months due to short-
term economic difficulties. Transition is a
long-term process that typically involves some
painful adjustments. Transition therefore needs to
be nurtured with care to ensure it survives. And
10
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION EASTERN EUROPEAN LESSONS FOR THE SOUTHERN MED Sapir and Zachmann
REFERENCES
Assaad, R. and F. Roudi-Fahimi (2007) ‘Youth in MENA: demographic opportunity or challenge?’ Popu-
lation Reference Bureau MENA Policy Brief
Barro, R. and J-W Lee (2010) ‘A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010’,
Working Paper no. 15902, NBER
Bhattacharya, R. and Wolde, H. (2010) ‘Constraints on Growth in the MENA Region (February 2010)’,
IMF Working Papers, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1555482
Calderón. C. and L. Servén (2004) ‘The effects of infrastructure development on growth and income
distribution’, Policy Research Working Paper 3400, World Bank
Casero, P-A and G-K Seshan (2010) ‘Economic Gains of Regional Agreements in the Maghreb: Deeper
versus Wider Integration’, in José R. López-Cálix, Peter Walkenhorst, and Ndiamé Diop (eds) Trade
Competitiveness of the Middle East and North Africa: Policies for Export Diversification, World Bank
Darden, K. and Grzymała-Busse, A. M. (2006) ‘The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Com-
munist Collapse’, World Politics 59(1), pp. 83-115
Ersel, Hasan and Magda Kandil (2007) ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth in the MENA
Countries’, in Jeffrey B., Nugent and Hashem Pesaran (eds) Explaining Growth in the Middle East,
Boston, Massachusetts: Elsevier
Iliev, P. and Putterman, L. (2007) ‘Social Capability, History and the Economies of Communist and
Postcommunist States’, Studies in Comparative International Development 42(1), pp 36-66
Kumar, N. and P. De (2008) ‘East Asian Infrastructure Development in a Comparative Global Perspec-
tive: An Analysis of RIS Infrastructure Index’, RIS Discussion Paper 135, Research and Information
System for Developing Countries
Méon, P-G and K. Sekkat (2004) ‘Does the Quality of Institutions Limit the MENA's Integration in the
World Economy?’ The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(9), pp 1475-1498
Michalek, J. (2007) ‘Full Integration versus Partial Trade Liberalization: Comparing the Economic Per-
formance of the New Member States and Mediterranean Partner Countries’, FEMISE report vol. FEM-
31-15
Nabli, M.K. and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, M-A (2007) ‘Reform complementarities and economic
growth in the Middle East and North Africa’, Journal of International Development 19(1) pp 17-54
Natorski, M. (2008) ‘The MEDA Programme in Morocco 12 years on: results, experiences and trends’,
Documentos CIDOB Mediterráneo 11
because painful structural reforms are difficult to
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